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Country-Level Institutions, Firm Value, and the Role of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiatives 
Abstract 
Drawing on transaction cost theories and the resource-based view of a firm, we posit that the value 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives is greater in countries where an absence of 
market-supporting institutions increases transaction costs and limits access to resources. Using a 
large sample of 11,672 firm-year observations representing 2,445 unique firms from 53 countries 
during 2003-2010 and controlling for firm-level unobservable heterogeneity, we find supportive 
evidence that CSR is more positively related to firm value in countries with weaker market 
institutions. We also provide evidence on the channels through which CSR initiatives reduce 
transaction costs. We find that CSR is associated with improved access to financing in countries 
with weaker equity and credit markets, greater investment and lower default risk in countries with 
more limited business freedom, and longer trade credit period and higher future sales growth in 
countries with weaker legal institutions. Our findings provide new insights on non-market 







Negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement costs arise due to transaction difficulties in the 
exchange process (Jones & Hill, 1988; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1975). 
Transaction cost theories suggest that specialized intermediaries, or institutions, emerge to 
mitigate the various costs associated with market failures (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). 
These institutions support the effective functioning of the market by allowing firms and 
individuals to engage in transactions without incurring undue costs or risks (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). However, if capital markets, regulatory systems, and contract 
enforcement mechanisms are absent or weak, as is often the case in emerging markets, firms 
must develop strategic responses to overcome these voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2011).1  
Prior studies emphasize several such responses to institutional voids: the creation of 
business groups that internalize the functions typically carried out by external markets (Chang & 
Hong, 2000; Fisman & Khanna, 2004; Leff, 1978); the formation of a strategic alliance with a 
foreign multinational firm from a country with strong monitoring institutions (Siegel, 2009); 
geographical clustering that creates local business environments (Karna, Taübe, & Sonderegger, 
2013); and internationalization to access more efficient and munificent foreign markets (Luo & 
Tung, 2007). Notably, all of these strategies are “market” responses to institutional voids. “Non-
market” strategies for addressing institutional voids, in contrast, have received little attention to 
date. In an effort to help fill this gap, we examine whether the strategic value of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is higher in countries with greater institutional voids. If CSR initiatives can 
help firms reduce the transaction costs arising from institutional voids, then the strategic value of 
CSR should be higher in countries with weak market-supporting institutions. 
Prior literature provides mixed views on the role of CSR. In the spirit of shareholder 





reduces profits. Similarly, CSR might be the outcome of an agency conflict between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976): CSR decisions may be driven by 
managers’ own social preferences or desire to establish relationships with specific stakeholders. 
More recent research, however, emphasizes the potential value of CSR to shareholders. In 
particular, instrumental stakeholder theory argues that CSR efforts can help firms obtain 
necessary resources or stakeholder support (e.g., Jones, 1995). CSR may also improve efficiency 
and enhance a firm’s reputation, brand, and trust (e.g., Barney, 1991; Hart, 1995; Porter, 1991; 
Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011; Russo & Fouts, 1997), and attract new customers (Lev, Petrovits, 
& Radhakrishnan, 2010). 
We posit that CSR initiatives help reduce transaction costs and improve access to 
resources. Because resources are important for a firm’s competitive advantage (Hill & Jones, 
1989; Robins, 1992; Williamson, 1985), reducing transaction costs can help create value (Foss & 
Foss, 2005). We further posit that the role of CSR in reducing transaction costs and improving 
access to resources is likely to be more pronounced in countries with institutional voids, as the 
absence of market-supporting institutions results in high transaction costs in these countries.2 
The rationale is as follows. If a country lacks strong equity and credit markets, firms will have 
difficulty raising external capital due to agency costs and information asymmetry problems. By 
increasing transparency (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Gelb & Strawser, 2001; Kim, Park, 
& Wier, 2012) and mitigating managerial opportunism (Bénabou & Tirol, 2010), CSR activities 
reduce agency costs and information asymmetry problems and thus help firms access financing 
at better terms (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014), which facilitates their growth. Similarly, if 
the state frequently intervenes in business operations, giving companies limited freedom, 





commitment to environmental sustainability and community wellbeing, CSR can generate 
community support and reduce roadblocks to positive net present value (NPV) investments. 
Trust and loyalty engendered by stable relations with external stakeholders create social capital, 
which can also reduce a firm’s risks and help the firm survive during tough times (Miller, Lee, 
Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009; Saxton, 1997). Finally, if contracts are not enforced by an 
effective legal system, consumers and suppliers cannot recover losses in the event the firm 
reneges on the terms of its contracts. Under such circumstances, suppliers will be reluctant to 
extend trade credit and customers will be hesitant to enter into long-term product or service 
agreements. By signaling a firm’s commitment not to exploit its stakeholders (Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2006; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2011; Zhang, Ma, Su, & Zhang, 2014), CSR can help 
increase consumers’ confidence in exchange agreements and suppliers’ willingness to extend 
trade credit.  
Using a sample of 11,672 firm-year observations representing 2,445 firms from 53 
countries over the period 2003-2010, we first examine whether the valuation effects of CSR vary 
with the strength of country-level, market-supporting institutions. In particular, we examine the 
relation between CSR and Tobin’s q, our proxy for firm value, as this relation summarizes the 
strategic value of CSR operating through various channels (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Waddock 
& Graves, 1997). In line with our prediction, we find that the strategic value of CSR is greater in 
countries with greater institutional voids.  
We next examine the channels through which CSR can help firms overcome institutional 
voids. To do so, we identify specific economic resources that are influenced by specific types of 
institutional voids. We then examine whether the role of CSR in facilitating access to a given 





countries with greater institutional voids. We find that the relation between CSR and both a 
firm’s access to financing and its growth through external financing is more pronounced in 
countries with weaker equity and credit markets. Also, the relation between CSR and both firm 
investment and default risk is more pronounced in countries with more limited business freedom, 
and the relation between CSR and both trade credit and future sales growth is more pronounced 
in countries with weaker legal institutions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section summarizes prior 
literature and develops a theory on the role of CSR in overcoming institutional voids. The third 
section describes the sample and research methodology. The fourth section presents our main 
results. The fifth section provides robustness checks. Finally, the last section discusses 
implications of the findings, contributions, limitations, and directions for future research. 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Transaction Costs, the Role of Institutions, and Institutional Voids3 
Transaction costs comprise the negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement costs incurred 
for an exchange between two parties to take place (Jones & Hill, 1988). The sources of these 
costs are the transaction difficulties that may be present in the exchange process (Klein et al., 
1978; Williamson, 1975).4 For example, gathering information, deciding whom to bargain with, 
and protecting existing contracts all impose significant costs and risk (Coase, 1960). Williamson 
(1985) argues that just as friction absorbs energy and reduces the efficiency of a mechanical 
system, transaction costs reduce economic efficiency and the potential value of an exchange.  
Transaction cost theories suggest that specialized intermediaries, or institutions, emerge 





1970; Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Such institutions support the effective functioning of 
markets by allowing firms and individuals to engage in transactions without incurring undue 
costs (Meyer et al., 2009). While the quality of institutions varies even in developed markets, 
firms operating in emerging markets face a number of institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 
2011). Absent strong equity and credit markets with information intermediaries such as financial 
analysts, investment banks, and the financial press, firms may not be able to raise adequate 
capital due to information asymmetry problems (Meyer et al., 2009). Moreover, if the state 
intervenes extensively in business operations, managers may have difficulty predicting the 
actions of regulatory bodies, which could impair their ability to make value-maximizing 
investment decisions. Direct government involvement, through state control of enterprises or 
banks, may further distort firms’ ability to compete fairly (Kuppuswamy, Serafeim, & 
Villalonga, 2012). Regulatory roadblocks can also impede the ability of firms to exploit new 
business opportunities that might emerge through the introduction of new products or services 
(Kuppuswamy et al., 2012). Finally, under weak legal institutions, consumers have limited 
ability to seek redress if a product fails to deliver on its promise, which can lead to product 
market failure (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). In short, where market-supporting institutions are 
absent or weak, firms must develop solutions to overcome market failures. 
Prior studies on strategies to address institutional voids focus primarily on “market-
based” approaches. For example, a number of studies suggest that by internalizing product and 
capital market intermediation, large and diversified conglomerates or business groups are 
efficient responses to transaction costs (Chang & Hong, 2000; Fisman & Khanna, 2004; Khanna 
& Palepu, 2000a; Leff, 1978; Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005). Siegel (2009) further suggests that 





institutions can improve a firm’s access to capital, as shared investment motivates the foreign 
multinational to monitor investment quality. Karna et al. (2013) argue that in an emerging 
economy context, geographical clusters can create a local business environment that helps 
multinational corporations overcome institutional voids. Similarly, Luo and Tung (2007) suggest 
that emerging-market firms can escape from home-country institutional voids and use aggressive 
internalization strategies to access more efficient foreign markets.   
However, these market-based strategies are associated with other significant costs. For 
example, unrelated diversification may lead to inefficient business decisions, and poorly 
developed markets for corporate control in emerging markets allow inefficiencies to persist (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1998). Conflicts between controlling family shareholders and minority shareholders can 
exacerbate this problem (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). In line with this argument, empirical 
evidence suggests that Indian business group affiliates are more difficult to monitor than 
otherwise comparable unaffiliated firms (Khanna & Palepu, 2000c).  
The above literature review reveals that prior studies focus primarily on market responses 
to institutional voids, with potential non-market strategies such as CSR receiving limited 
attention. Given this gap in the literature, we develop a theoretical framework that can help us 
understand the role of CSR in mitigating transaction costs, facilitating firms’ access to resources, 
and ultimately improving firms’ competitive advantage in countries with institutional voids.  
The Strategic Value of CSR 
In this paper, we adopt the definition of CSR proposed by McWilliams and Siegel 





beyond the interests of the firm or what is required by law. Examples of CSR activities include 
going beyond legal requirements in a firm’s human resource or recycling programs, exerting 
efforts to reduce pollution, supporting local communities, and embodying products with social 
attributes or characteristics.  
The strategic value of CSR is well recognized in the literature. Baron (2001) argues that 
companies compete for socially responsible customers by explicitly linking their social 
contributions to product sales. Porter and Kramer (2002, 2006) argue that corporate philanthropy 
can be leveraged to enhance a firm’s competitive advantage. Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani (2012) 
similarly suggest that a firm’s social and environmental practices can enhance its competitive 
advantage. A body of literature examines the relation between CSR and financial performance. 
Waddock and Graves (1997) report a positive and significant relation between CSR and future as 
well as prior financial performance. Pava and Krausz (1996) also find that firms perceived as 
socially responsible perform as well as or better than firms that do not engage in socially 
responsible activities.5  
In the next section, we develop a theoretical framework that predicts a greater strategic 
value of CSR initiatives in countries with greater institutional voids. We diagram our theoretical 
framework in Figure 1. 
-------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The Role of CSR in Filling Institutional Voids 
The resource-based view depicts the firm as a unique collection of resources (Penrose, 
1995; Wernerfelt, 1984), and posits that the possession of key resources allows the firm to 





1985). The resource combination of a firm is influenced by transaction costs (Teece, 1982; 
Williamson, 1991) because transaction costs such as search, negotiation/contract, and 
monitoring/enforcement costs prevent firms from acquiring resources (Reeve, 1990; Yao, 1988). 
As resources are important for a firm’s competitive advantage, strategic opportunities arise from 
reducing transaction costs. That is, while transaction costs are a major source of value 
dissipation, reducing transaction costs can create value (Foss & Foss, 2005). 
Limited market mechanisms in countries with institutional voids increase transaction 
costs. Firms in these countries thus have strong incentives to minimize transaction costs. By 
developing close social connections with external stakeholders who provide resources, CSR may 
help fill gaps in the political, social, and economic infrastructure of emerging markets (Miller et 
al., 2009), reducing the firm’s transaction costs. 
Prior studies show that investors associate firms investing in CSR with high transparency 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Gelb & Strawser, 2001; Kim et al., 2012) and low short-term opportunism 
(Bénabou & Tirol, 2010), which helps lower perceived agency costs and information asymmetry. 
Lower agency costs and information asymmetry facilitate access to external capital (Cheng et al., 
2014; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011), which in turn accelerate firm growth. 
Ongoing, positive relationships with communities resulting from CSR can also reduce 
compliance costs (Belkaoui, 1976; Bragdon & Marlin, 1972; Freedman & Stagliano, 1991; 
Shane & Spicer, 1983; Spicer, 1978) and decrease a firm’s exposure to risk (Godfrey, 2005; 
Miller et al., 2009; Saxton, 1997). Lower investment risk allows firms to realize valuable 





In addition, CSR initiatives help reduce contracting costs by signaling a firm’s 
commitment to act in accordance with stakeholders’ expectations (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; 
Du et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2014), which may evoke reciprocal commitment by suppliers 
through trade credit. CSR investments also result in greater trust and reputation, which can help 
increase customer loyalty and attract new customers (Lev et al., 2010). 
In summary, CSR can reduce transaction costs and increase access to capital, social, and 
reputational resources that are hard to obtain in countries with institutional voids. Thus, CSR 
provides competitive advantage for firms operating in these countries.6 Just as internal markets 
available to diversified entities such as business groups are relatively more useful when 
specialized intermediaries are absent and functioning of external markets is thus compromised 
(Ricart, Enright, Ghemawat, Hart, & Khanna, 2004), these effects of CSR are expected to be 
more pronounced in countries with institutional voids, where transaction costs are higher and, as 
a result, access to these key resources is limited. Thus the strategic value of CSR should be 
greater in countries with greater institutional voids, consistent with the conjecture of Rodriguez, 
Siegel, Hillman, and Eden (2006) that cross-country institutional differences lead to different 
expectations and different returns to CSR.7 The fact that not many firms have capabilities to 
invest in CSR in countries with institutional voids also adds to a greater competitive advantage 
of firms that do invest in CSR (Flammer, 2015). This discussion leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. CSR and firm value are more positively associated in countries with weaker 
market-supporting institutions than in countries with stronger market-supporting 
institutions. 
CSR can improve firm value in the absence of strong market-supporting institutions 





agency costs and information asymmetry. High agency costs and information asymmetry 
constrain access to external financing. Since CSR increases transparency (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 
Gelb & Strawser, 2001; Kim et al., 2012) and reduces short-term opportunism (Bénabou & 
Tirole, 2010), it improves firm access to financing (Cheng et al., 2014). We expect this role of 
CSR to be greater in countries with weaker capital markets, where a lack of information 
intermediaries results in greater information asymmetry and agency problems. This leads to our 
second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Access to capital through new equity or debt issues is more positively 
associated with CSR in countries with weaker capital markets than in countries with 
stronger capital markets. 
Improved access to financial resources allows firms to grow through external financing. 
As the role of CSR in facilitating access to external financing is greater in countries with weaker 
capital markets, the effect of CSR on excess growth through external financing will also be 
greater in such countries. More formally:  
Hypothesis 3. Excess growth through external financing is more positively associated with 
CSR in countries with weaker capital markets than in countries with stronger capital markets. 
Next, in countries with limited business freedom, the costs of complying with regulations 
are high. Government bureaucracies often make entry too expensive or time-consuming. Further, 
the risk of assets being nationalized may discourage firms from making investments (Fisman & 
Khanna, 2004).  
CSR helps develop deeper relationships with external stakeholders and build social 





trust and loyalty reduces uncertainty faced by firms as it increases preferential treatment by 
social actors within the community or government (Oliver, 1991) and deflects adverse attention 
from constituents that could impair opportunities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). For example, 
commitment to environmental sustainability and social wellbeing can mobilize community 
support, easing tension between firms and regulators and reducing compliance costs. We thus 
expect the effect of CSR on the level of investment to be more pronounced in countries with 
more limited business freedom, where high compliance costs and investment risk reduce firms’ 
incentives and ability to make value-maximizing investments: 
Hypothesis 4. The level of investment is more positively associated with CSR in 
countries with more limited business freedom than in countries with greater business 
freedom. 
Prior studies also suggest that CSR can help firms avoid costly government fines 
(Belkaoui, 1976; Bragdon & Marlin, 1972; Freedman & Stagliano, 1991; Shane & Spicer, 198l; 
Spicer, 1978), reducing a firm’s exposure to risk (Godfrey, 2005). The social capital engendered 
by stable relations with external stakeholders can also reduce the risks associated with a firm and 
help a firm to survive during tough times (Miller et al., 2009; Saxton, 1997). The ability to 
realize valuable investment projects also increases the chance of survival. Thus, we expect firms 
that invest in CSR to have a greater chance of survival. Again, as compliance costs and business 
risk are greater in countries with more limited business freedom, the positive relation between 
CSR and the chance of survival would be more pronounced in such countries: 
Hypothesis 5. The chance of survival is more positively associated with CSR in countries 






Weak legal institutions and limited enforcement of liability laws increase contracting 
costs. When contracts are not enforced by an effective legal system, consumers and suppliers 
cannot recover losses in the event the firm reneges on the terms of its contracts, leading to 
product market failure. For instance, consumers will have concerns about product quality and 
long-term service agreements, and suppliers will have concerns about extending trade credit. As 
a result, contracting costs are high in countries with weaker legal institutions and more limited 
property rights. That is, suppliers are reluctant to extend trade credits and customers are hesitant 
to enter into long-term product or service agreements. 
Prior studies suggest that companies engage in CSR in order to enhance their reputation, 
brand, and trust (e.g., Porter, 1991; Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011; Russo & Fouts, 1997). 
Ongoing, long-term relationships with external stakeholders engender trust and goodwill, and 
reduce transaction costs (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). For example, 
investing in stakeholder relations can lead to customer or supplier loyalty (Hillman & Keim, 
2001). 
CSR initiatives signal a firm’s commitment to act in accordance with stakeholders’ 
expectations (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Du et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2014), which may evoke 
reciprocal commitment. When reputation and trust are lacking, suppliers may not extend trade 
credit to the firm. Since the need to reduce transaction costs is greater in countries with greater 
institutional voids, we expect the relation between CSR and the extent of trade credit to be more 






Hypothesis 6. The trade credit period is more positively associated with CSR in countries 
with weaker legal institutions and more limited property rights than in countries with 
stronger legal institutions and more secure property rights. 
Intangible resources such as reputation, brand, and trust may attract new customers (e.g., 
socially conscious consumers), increase a firm’s profitability, and enhance its competitiveness. 
As CSR initiatives help build customer loyalty and attract new customers (Lev et al., 2010) and 
the need for reducing contracting costs is greater in countries with weaker legal systems and 
more limited property rights, we expect the positive association between CSR and future sales 
growth to be more pronounced in such countries: 
Hypothesis 7. Future sales growth is more positively associated with CSR in countries 
with weaker legal institutions and more limited property rights than in countries with 
stronger legal institutions and more secure property rights.  
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Sample Construction 
To test the prediction that CSR is more valuable for firms that operate in countries with 
weaker institutions, we begin by collecting data on CSR from Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4. This 
database “provides objective, relevant and systematic environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) information”8 for over 3,400 listed companies included in S&P 500, Russell 1000, MSCI 
Europe, FTSE 250, ASX 300, MSCI World Index, and 250 MSCI emerging market companies. 
Thomson Reuters states that “using only publicly available information, our 100+ specially 
trained analysts scour through company reports and other public sources, and transform the 
results into comparable and consistent units to enable assessment of different entities.” ASSET4 





2014; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 2015).9 We then match the 
ASSET4 data with Compustat North America and Global files to obtain financial data. We 
exclude firms in the financial industry (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) because their 
regulatory setting is different from that of other firms. We also drop observations with missing 
values for the regression variables. This procedure yields a sample of 11,672 firm-years 
representing 2,445 firms from 53 countries over the period 2003-2010.  
Table 1 provides the sample distribution by country, year, and Fama and French (1997) 
industry classification. Panel A shows that there is wide variation in the number of firm-years 
across countries: the U.S. is the most representative country, accounting for 3,658 firm-years, 
while Panama and Qatar are the least representative countries, with just one firm-year each.10 
Panel B shows that the number of firm-years increases steadily over the sample period, from 644 
in 2003 to 2,344 in 2010. Panel C shows that the sample is fairly dispersed across industries, 
with no single industry group representing more than 10% of the sample observations.  
-------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Variable Measurements 
Firm value. We examine the relation between CSR and firm value because it captures the 
cumulative valuation effect of CSR operating through various channels. Following extensive 
prior research in economics, finance, and strategy (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Waddock & Graves, 1997), we measure firm value using Tobin’s q 
(TOBQ), which is the market value of the firm divided by the replacement value of the firm’s 
assets. We compute Tobin’s q as market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book 





Tamayo (2013), except we do not subtract deferred taxes from the numerator, as this variable is 
missing for a significant number of firms in Compustat Global.  
Channels. Hypotheses 2 through 7 predict that various firm-level outcomes (the 
channels) are more positively related to CSR in countries with weaker market-supporting 
institutions. These firm-level outcomes represent resources and competitive advantages achieved 
through CSR initiatives as CSR investments reduce transaction costs. We define our proxies for 
these firm-level outcomes below. 
Equity issuance. Following McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012) we measure the net amount of 
equity issued as the change in book equity, plus the change in deferred taxes, minus the change 
in retained earnings. To rule out trivial changes in equity, we construct Equity Issue as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the net amount of equity issued divided by lagged assets exceeds 1%, and 0 
otherwise.  
Excess growth. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), we first construct the 
externally financed growth rate as the difference between the firm’s actual growth rate 
(measured as sales growth) minus the maximum growth rate that can be financed if the firm 
relies only on internal resources and maintains its dividend (measured as ROA/(1-ROA)). We 
then define Excess Growth as the geometric average of the externally financed growth rate over 
the next two years (Durnev & Kim, 2005).  
Debt issuance. We follow McLean et al. (2012) to measure the net amount of debt issued as the 
change in total debt. Debt Issue is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the net amount of debt 





Investment. We capture investment intensity (Investment) using the ratio of capital expenditures 
to lagged property, plant, and equipment (Cleary, 1999).  
Probability of default. We capture the probability of bankruptcy using the Black-Scholes-Merton 
option-pricing model as implemented by Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004). This 
model values equity as a European call option on the value of the firm’s assets. The value of 
equity, , is obtained as 1 , where .  is the 
standard cumulative normal distribution, ⁄ 2⁄ √⁄ , 
√ ,  is the value of asset,  is the dividend rate measured as dividends to ,  is the 
face value of debt measured as total liabilities,  is assumed to be equal to 1 year,  is the risk-
free rate measured as the yield on 1-year constant-maturity U.S. Treasury securities, and  is the 
volatility of asset returns.  and  are estimated by solving the equity value equation above and 
the optimal hedge equation: 	⁄ , where  is the volatility of equity 
returns computed over the previous year. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP (for U.S. firms) 
and Compustat Global (for non-U.S. firms). The firm’s asset returns are then given by 




Payable turnover. We calculate the frequency with which the firm pays its suppliers (Payable 
Turnover) as the ratio of cost of goods sold to accounts payable. Payable Turnover is inversely 
related to the length of the trade credit period extended by suppliers.  
Sales growth. We measure future sales growth (Sales Growth) as the geometric average of 





CSR. ASSET4 data contain scores on environmental, social, economic, and governance 
performance. For each firm, over 250 objective indicators are used to calculate these four 
performance scores. Following previous studies (e.g., Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Luo et al., 
2015), we capture a firm’s overall CSR performance score (CSR_P) as the average of its 
environmental performance score and social performance score.11 The environmental 
performance score measures a firm’s impact on living and non-living natural systems including 
the air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. This measure captures, for example, 
resource reduction, emission reduction, and product innovation benefiting the environment. The 
social performance score measures the extent of trust and loyalty between a firm and its 
workforce, customers, and society through investment in customer/product responsibility, 
community, human rights, diversity, employee training and development, health and safety, and 
employment quality. The original ASSET4 scores each lie between 0 and 100. We normalize 
CSR_P such that it ranges between 0 and 1. 
Country-level institutions. Prior studies on institutional voids consider various measures 
of the strength of market-supporting institutions.12 Consistent with our theoretical framework on 
the channels through which CSR mitigates transaction costs under institutional voids, and 
following Meyer et al. (2009), we focus on proxies for the strength of market-supporting 
institutions in the areas of stock and credit market, regulatory system, and legal system & 
property rights.  
To do so, we rely on the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) and Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) data from the Fraser Institute.13 More specifically, we use the 
following four indices: (1) WCY’s Stock Market Efficiency, which indicates whether stock 





captures whether credit is readily available to businesses, (3) EFW’s Business Freedom, which 
assesses freedom from regulations as reflected by administrative requirements, bureaucratic costs, 
ease of entry, bribes/other extra payments required, licensing restrictions, and the cost of tax 
compliance, and (4) EFW’s Legal System & Property Rights, which evaluates the quality of the 
legal system based on judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property rights, 
military interference in the rule of law and politics, integrity of the legal system, legal enforcement 
of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property, reliability of police, and business 
costs of crime. Each of these indices ranges from 0 to 10. Higher values indicate more efficient 
stock markets, easier access to external financing, fewer regulatory hurdles to firm entry and 
operations, and better contract and property rights enforcement.14  
Appendix A summarizes variable definitions and data sources. Appendix B reports the 
values for each of the institutional indices by country, averaged over the sample period. Table 2 
provides summary statistics for Tobin’s q and the CSR measure by country in Panel A, and for 
the firm-level variables, the natural logarithm of GDP, and the country-level institutional indices 
in Panel B. Tobin’s q, the CSR measure, and the country-level institutional indices all display a 
high degree of variation across sample observations. 
------------------------ 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------ 
Test Models 
We argue in Hypothesis 1 that CSR performance and firm value are more positively 
associated in countries with weaker market-supporting institutions than in countries with 





areas of stock and credit market, regulatory system, and legal system efficiency) affects the 




where i indexes firms, t indexes years, TOBQ is Tobin’s q, CSR_P is our proxy for CSR 
performance, Institution is one of the four country-level institutional indices discussed above, 
CONTROL includes the firm- (SIZE, ROA, LEV, R&D/S, SGR) and country-level (LOG_GDP) 
control variables, µi denotes firm fixed effects, µt denotes year fixed effects, and ε is an error 
term. α3, the coefficient on the interaction between the institutional variable (Institution) and the 
CSR proxy (CSR_P) gives the value implication of CSR across countries with varying degrees of 
institutional strength. 
We include control variables commonly used in firm value regressions to ensure that the 
coefficient on CSR does not pick up the effects of other correlated factors. Larger firms are more 
diversified and, thus, suffer more from the diversification discount (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & 
Lang, 2002). We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ 
(SIZE). Profitable firms should have higher valuations (Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, & Eilert, 
2013). We gauge profitability using return on assets, i.e., the ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items to total assets (ROA). Highly levered firms likely incur agency costs of debt 
and financial distress costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). We measure leverage using 
the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEV). Research and development expenditures are typically 





the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales (R&D/S), where missing research 
and development expenses are set to zero. Growing firms have higher valuations (Klapper & 
Love, 2004). We measure growth opportunities using sales growth, defined as the change in 
sales from the previous year (SGR). Firms located in economically developed countries may 
have higher valuations (Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li, & Shao, 2015). We measure economic 
development using the natural logarithm of GDP per capita each year evaluated in 2000 US$ 
(LOG_GDP). 
To mitigate concerns about reverse causality and simultaneity bias, we lag the right-hand-
side variables by one period.15 To address concerns about endogeneity stemming from omitted 
variables correlated with CSR and firm value, we follow Servaes and Tamayo (2013) and 
include firm fixed effects.16,17 Equation (1) also includes year fixed effects. To address cross-
sectional dependence and time-series correlation in our panel data set we report robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering by firm.  
In Hypotheses 2 through 7 we separately consider different channels through which CSR 
can help firms overcome institutional voids and thereby increase value. These channels include 
improved access to financing and excess growth through external financing in countries with 
weak equity and credit market efficiency, increased investment and lower default risk in 
countries with limited business freedom, and lower payable turnover (i.e., longer trade credit 
period) and higher future sales growth in countries with weak legal institutions. To examine how 
the strength of a country’s market-supporting institutions affect the relation between CSR and 
these channels, we replace the dependent variable, TOBQ, in equation (1) with seven firm-level 
outcomes (channels). As discussed above, we capture access to equity markets using a dummy 





Issue), and the value generated from accessing external financial (equity and debt) markets using 
externally financed growth (Excess Growth). We capture investment intensity using the ratio of 
capital expenditures to lagged property, plant, and equipment (Investment) and the probability of 
default using the probability of bankruptcy derived from the Black-Scholes-Merton model 
(Bankruptcy). Finally, we measure payable turnover using the ratio of cost of goods sold to 
accounts payable (Payable Turnover) and future sales growth using sales growth over the next 





The Relation between CSR and Firm Value: The Role of Market-Supporting Institutions 
Table 3 reports the results of testing Hypothesis 1. We find that the coefficient on CSR_P 
is positive and statistically significant across all models. This evidence, based on regressions that 
control for various dimensions of the institutional environment as well as firm fixed effects, 
suggests that CSR is value-increasing, consistent with strategic stakeholder management. 
Moreover, the institutional indices load positively and are significant at conventional levels 
across all models, suggesting that strong market-supporting institutions also contribute to 
corporate value. More importantly for our purposes, the relation between CSR and firm value is 
weaker (stronger) in countries with stronger (weaker) market-supporting institutions. 
Specifically, the coefficients on the interactions between CSR_P and the institutional indices 
capturing stock and credit market efficiency, the extent of business freedom, and legal system 





prediction.18 The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with those in earlier 
studies. In particular, larger and more established firms are associated with lower Tobin’s q, better 
performing firms have higher Tobin’s q, and firms with greater leverage have lower Tobin’s q. 
------------------------ 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------ 
Based on the results in Table 3, we can determine the economic significance of the effect 
of market-supporting institutions on the relation between CSR and firm value. Specifically, one 
can calculate the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR_P on TOBQ for different 
levels of institutional strength. When Stock Market Efficiency is set to its first quartile value 
(4.93), a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR_P (0.29) is associated with an increase in 
TOBQ of (0.753-0.105×4.93)×0.29=0.07. In contrast, when Stock Market Efficiency is set to its 
third quartile value (6.92), a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR_P (0.29) is associated with 
an increase in TOBQ of (0.753-0.105×6.92)×0.29=0.01. The difference of 0.06 is not trivial 
given that the mean (median) TOBQ is 1.76 (1.43). The corresponding differences for the other 
institutional indices are: 0.06 for Credit Market Efficiency, 0.04 for Business Freedom, and 0.09 
for Legal System & Property Rights. Appendix C provides details on how we calculate the 
economic significance of the effect of market-supporting institutions on the relation between 
CSR and firm value.  
Channels 
Table 4 reports the results of testing Hypotheses 2 through 7. In columns (1) through (4), 
we find that the coefficients on the interactions between our proxies for the strength of capital 
market efficiency and CSR_P are negative and significant, implying that the impact of CSR 





countries with weaker capital markets. These results are in line with Hypotheses 2 and 3, and 
suggest that CSR activities help firms overcome weak stock and credit markets by allowing them 
to access external financing and achieve higher growth than possible if they were to rely only on 
internally generated capital.  
------------------------ 
Table 4 about here 
------------------------ 
In column (5) (column (6)), we find that the coefficients on the interactions between our 
proxies for business freedom and CSR_P are negative (positive) and significant, implying that 
the impact of CSR performance on investment intensity (probability of bankruptcy) is higher 
(lower) in countries with limited business freedom. These results support Hypotheses 4 and 5, 
and suggest that CSR initiatives help firms overcome voids in regulatory institutions by allowing 
them to make positive NPV investments, thus increasing their chance of survival. 
In column (7) (column (8)), we find that the coefficients on the interaction between our 
proxy for legal system efficiency and CSR_P is positive (negative) and significant, indicating 
that the effect of CSR performance on payable turnover (future sales growth) is lower (higher) in 
countries with weaker legal institutions and limited property rights. These results support 
Hypotheses 6 and 7, and suggest that firms with high CSR scores have a positive reputation with 
suppliers and customers that allows them to obtain better credit terms and higher future sales 
growth.  
Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that firms that actively engage in 
CSR activities can reduce transaction costs, improve access to resources, and enhance 
competitive advantages in countries with weak or absent market-supporting institutions and 






In this section, we address concerns about potential endogeneity influencing our results. 
For parsimony, we focus on the relation between CSR and Tobin’s q, as it summarizes the 
valuation effect of CSR operating through various channels. In addition, the relation between 
CSR and Tobin’s q applies to the various institutions we examine, unlike various firm-level 
outcomes (channels), which apply only to a subset of market institutions. 
Heckman Sample Selection Test 
One concern is that our sample may not be random. In particular, one might argue that 
successful firms in weak institutional environments with higher CSR performance drive our 
results, with ASSET4 overlooking firms in weak institutional environments with lower CSR 
performance. That is, one might be concerned that our analyses suffer from sample selection 
bias. To address this concern, we merge the ASSET4 sample with the Compustat North America 
and Compustat Global universe, and distinguish firms with CSR scores (i.e., covered in 
ASSET4) from firms without CSR scores (i.e., not covered in ASSET4). We then perform a 
Heckman-type correction. To do so, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is covered 
in ASSET4, and 0 otherwise. We then estimate a Probit model with this dummy as a dependent 
variable and firm characteristics (SIZE, ROA, LEV, R&D/S, and SGR) as well as country 
characteristics (LOG_GDP, Stock Market Efficiency, Credit Market Efficiency, Business 
Freedom, and Legal System & Property Rights) as independent variables. We also include year 
and industry effects. Using the predicted values from this Probit estimation, we obtain the 
inverse Mills ratio (LAMBDA), which we include as an additional control in equation (1). The 
inverse Mills ratio controls for selection bias. Untabulated results show that the coefficients on 





statistically significant, confirming the results in Table 3. Additional documentation and results 
from this analysis are available in the online appendix. 
Propensity Score Matching 
A firm’s decision to increase its CSR performance depends on the costs and benefits of 
CSR investment, which are determined in part by firm characteristics. Therefore, one might be 
concerned that firm characteristics rather than CSR drive the result that socially responsible 
firms are associated with higher valuations in countries with weaker market-supporting 
institutions. To address this concern, we randomize our sample by employing the propensity 
score matching method developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We first construct a dummy 
variable indicating whether CSR_P is higher than the country median, CSR_P_HI. We then 
regress this indicator variable on firm- (SIZE, ROA, LEV, R&D/S, SGR) and country-level 
(LOG_GDP) variables to obtain the predicted probability (propensity score) from the Probit 
regression model. Next, we match each observation from the treatment group (i.e., CSR_P_HI=1) 
to an observation in the control group (i.e., CSR_P_HI=0) with the closest propensity score.19 
Using the matched sample, we continue to find that the coefficient on the interaction between 
CSR_P and the proxies for market-supporting institutions are negative and statistically significant 
across all models. Therefore, our results are robust to matching on the determinants of CSR 
performance, suggesting that firm characteristics do not drive our results.20 Additional 
documentation and results from this analysis are available in the online appendix. 
Excluding Cross-Listed Firms  
Firms cross-listed on major stock exchanges have access to resources in countries in 
which the stock exchanges are located and therefore are less likely to be affected by weak 





against finding a relation between country-level market-supporting institutions and the CSR-
valuation link. However, if cross-listed firms are more likely to be located in developed countries 
and such firms invest in CSR and have higher values, inclusion of cross-listed firms in the 
sample might influence our results. To rule out this possibility, we re-estimate our regressions 
after excluding firms cross-listed on major U.S. stock exchanges using the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Central Index Key information in Compustat Global. Firms cross-listed 
in the U.S. represent roughly 20% of our sample firm-years. Untabulated tests show that all of 
our results are robust to excluding these cross-listed firms from the sample. The results from this 
analysis are available in the online appendix. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Summary and Contributions to the Literature 
Building on transaction cost theories and the resource-based view of a firm, we develop a 
theoretical framework that predicts greater strategic value of CSR in countries with weaker 
market-supporting institutions. The absence of market-supporting institutions results in higher 
transaction costs and limited access to resources. We argue that CSR helps reduce transaction 
costs and facilitates access to resources, thereby improving competitive advantage of firms 
operating in countries with institutional voids. Using a sample of 2,445 firms from 53 countries 
over the period 2003-2010 and controlling for firm-level unobservable heterogeneity, we find 
supportive evidence that CSR is more positively related to firm value in countries with weaker 
market institutions. In particular, we find that CSR is associated with improved access to 
financing in countries with weaker equity and credit markets, greater investment and lower 





higher future sales growth in countries with weaker legal institutions and more limited property 
rights.  
Endogeneity is a concern in international business research because a randomized 
controlled experiment is not feasible (Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 2012). Endogeneity has 
also been recognized as a concern for studies that examine the relation between CSR and 
financial performance (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Rodriguez et al., 2006). Following Reeb et 
al.’s (2012) suggestion, we apply several research design choices (e.g., firm fixed effects, 
propensity score matching, and instrumental variables approaches) that approximate 
randomization.  
The fixed effects design is a generalization of the difference-in-differences approach 
(Imai & Kim, 2014) and is well suited for analyses with panel data. One caveat of firm-fixed 
effect models is the possibility of fixed effects removing the theoretical, cross-sectional variation 
of interest when firm characteristics change slowly over time (Zhou, 2001). While it may be 
difficult to interpret a lack of evidence from fixed effects, evidence of causal relation in firm-fixed 
effect models can be quite compelling (Reeb et al., 2012). We base all our analyses on firm-fixed 
effect models and obtain results consistent with our hypotheses. 
Matching approximates a randomized-controlled experiment by eliminating firms from 
either the treatment or control group that do not share similar characteristics (Angrist & Pischke, 
2008). Propensity score matching allows a refined matching process along multiple firm 
characteristics (Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). The instrumental variables approach deals with 





results are robust to propensity score matching based on the determinants of CSR and to 
instrumental variables approach using industry-year average CSR as an instrumental variable. 
Our study makes several important contributions to international business research. Most 
importantly, we add to the literature on institutional voids by providing new theoretical and 
empirical insights. While prior studies focus primarily on market responses to institutional voids, 
such as business groups and strategic alliances (Fisman & Khanna, 2004; Khanna & Palepu, 
2000a; Leff, 1978; Peng et al., 2005; Siegel, 2009), we develop a theoretical framework that 
explains the role of CSR in filling institutional voids. Based on transaction cost theories and the 
resource-based view of a firm, we posit that CSR improves a firm’s competitive advantages by 
reducing transaction costs, thereby facilitating access to resources when market-supporting 
institutions are weak. Our empirical results are consistent with this prediction.21  
Our study also contributes to recent literature on the factors mediating the relation 
between CSR and firm value (Luo at al., 2015; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Surroca, Tribo, & 
Waddock, 2010; Wang & Bansal, 2012). Our results suggest that the country-level institutional 
environment affects the link between CSR and firm value. In particular, the more positive 
relation between CSR and firm value in countries with weaker market-supporting institutions 
suggests that the strategic value of CSR is greater where institutional voids lead to higher 
transaction costs. 
Finally, our study contributes to the literature on transaction costs. Traditional transaction 
cost research focuses on micro-analytical aspects such as opportunism and bounded rationality 
(Meyer et al., 2009), while the role of macro-level factors such as country-level regulatory 





Meyer et al. (2009) examine the impact of market-supporting institutions on business strategies 
by analyzing the entry strategy of foreign investors in emerging markets. We extend this line of 
research by showing that a non-market strategy (e.g., CSR) can help reduce transaction costs 
when market-supporting institutions are absent or weak.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
Our study responds to a call for interdisciplinary research on the role of market and non-
market strategies in addressing institutional voids. Our results on the role of CSR in filling 
institutional voids should be interpreted with the following limitations in mind. First, while firm 
fixed effects and the instrumental variables approach are designed to address endogeneity 
between CSR and firm value, unobserved factors that shape the strength of country-level 
institutions may also affect the relation between CSR and firm value. Ideally, we would examine 
whether that relation changes after exogenous shocks to market-supporting institutions induced 
by regulatory changes. Unfortunately, identifying such a natural experimental setting is known to 
be difficult. Future studies may leverage an exogenous shock in one country or multiple 
countries to re-examine our predictions. Second, while we focus on how market-supporting 
institutions influence the relation between CSR and firm value, other types of institutions or 
national culture may also affect the strategic value of CSR. Future research might examine the 
effect of alternative macro-level factors on the strategic value of CSR. Third, while we focus on 
CSR as a non-market strategy to help address market failures associated with institutional voids, 
other types of non-market mechanisms, such as ethnic identity, religion, or culture, can also 
reduce transaction costs and help access resources when market-supporting institutions are 
absent or weak. Research examining the role of various non-market mechanisms would improve 






1 While prior literature tends to associate institutional voids with emerging markets, the quality of 
developed markets’ institutions also varies (e.g., Khanna & Palepu, 2010). 
2 Our theoretical framework is consistent with Khanna, Palepu, & Bullock (2010), who argue that “a 
prospective emerging giant can build confidence and social capital in consumer, supplier and investor 
circles, contributing to its competitive advantage.” The authors offer a few examples of firms that have 
employed CSR to fill institutional voids. For instance, Zain—a telecom provider—introduced One 
Network in Sub-Saharan Africa, which effectively eliminated roaming charges in this market. This 
strategy was specifically designed to make telecommunications accessible to poor customers. Zain also 
invested heavily in Africa, creating direct and indirect employment and quickly becoming the largest tax-
payer in many countries in which it operated. The positive image of “partner in progress” smoothed 
Zain’s government relations and helped it become the world’s fastest growing telecom provider by 2008. 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this theoretical framework.  
4 Jones and Hill (1988) suggest bounded rationality, opportunism, uncertainty and complexity, a low 
number of trading relationships, information asymmetry, and asset specificity as six main factors leading 
to transaction difficulties. 
5 Other studies report no relation (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000) or a negative relation (Wright & Ferris, 
1997). Recent meta-analyses (e.g., Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003) 
note that this line of research generally finds a positive relation between CSR and corporate financial 
performance, particularly in recent years. However, the direction of causality remains largely unresolved. 
6 Corporations engage in socially responsible activities for a variety of reasons; some are strategic and 
others are altruistic (Baron, 2001; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Young and Makhija (2014) provide a 
thorough discussion and integration of CSR theories. While firms may invest in CSR for altruistic reasons 
in countries with strong institutions, the strategic value of CSR in reducing transaction costs in emerging 





                                                                                                                                                             
economies suggests that the strategic value of CSR is greater in countries with weaker market-supporting 
institutions than in countries with stronger institutions. 
7 In the international business context, Strike, Gao, and Bansal (2006) assess whether international 
diversification affects the propensity of firms to be socially responsible or irresponsible. Husted and Allen 
(2006) assess the relation between multinational enterprises’ global or country-specific CSR and their 
international organizational strategy. Luo (2006) examines the relation between CSR and the political 
strategy of multinational enterprises. Christmann and Taylor (2006) find that a firm shapes its CSR strategy 
in response to customer preference, monitoring, and expected sanctions, and Waldman, Siegel, and Javidan 
(2006) show that country-specific cultural factors and CEO leadership characteristics are associated with the 
values that top management team members attach to CSR. 
8 See http://im.thomsonreuters.com/solutions/content/asset4-esg/.  
9 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use CSR ratings from Governance Metrics International 
as an alternative proxy for CSR. 
10 To ensure our results are not driven by a few countries, we re-run our regressions after excluding 
countries with fewer than 10 observations (15 countries) and fewer than 100 observations (35 countries). 
We further estimate weighted regressions where weights are given by the inverse of the number of 
observations per country. Untabulated results are consistent with those reported, suggesting that our 
results are not driven by heterogeneity in the number of observations across countries. 
11 All of our inferences are qualitatively similar when we examine the environmental performance and 
social performance scores separately. 
12 For example, Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha (2005) examine institutional voids in terms of political and 
social systems, openness to foreign investment, and quality of product, labor, and capital markets. Meyer 
et al. (2009) and Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, and Chittoor (2010) focus on the areas of business freedom, 
trade freedom, property rights, investment freedom, and financial freedom. Chakrabarty (2009) captures 





                                                                                                                                                             
13 These databases have the advantage of consistently providing a time series of relevant institutional 
variables for a large number of countries.  
14 With respect to legal institutions, Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson (2014: 5) argue that “perhaps more than 
any other area, this area is essential for the efficient allocation of resources. Countries with major 
deficiencies in this area are unlikely to prosper regardless of their policies in the other four areas.” 
15 We also check potential reverse causality between CSR and firm value through the Granger causality 
test. Specifically, we regress TOBQ and CSR_P on lagged TOBQ, lagged CSR_P, the vector of other 
controls (SIZE, ROA, LEV, R&D/S, SGR, and LOG_GDP), as well as year and firm fixed effects. In an 
alternative specification, we add an additional lag of TOBQ and CSR_P. Untabulated results show that 
TOBQ does not Granger-cause CSR_P, suggesting that reverse causality is not a significant concern in our 
study.  
16 Servaes and Tamayo (2013) argue that mixed findings in the literature on the link between CSR and 
firm value are due in part to model misspecification arising from the omission of controls for time-
invariant unobservable firm characteristics. A Hausman test rejects firm random effects in favor of firm 
fixed effects. The fixed effects design is a generalization of the difference-in-differences approach (Imai 
& Kim, 2014). 
17 If firm CSR policies are sticky, i.e., change little over time, the relation between CSR and firm value is 
driven by cross-sectional rather than time series variation in CSR. Zhou (2001) shows that in such a case, 
firm fixed effects may absorb the effect of CSR on firm value, leaving CSR with no significant explanatory 
power in firm value regressions. In other words, we might fail to detect a relation between CSR and firm 
value even if one truly exists. To explore this issue, we calculate between (cross-sectional) and within (time-
series) variation in CSR. For the between variation, we calculate the standard deviation of CSR by year 
across firms. The average of these standard deviations is 0.28. For the within variation, we calculate 





                                                                                                                                                             
between variation in CSR is larger than within variation, there is still relatively enough within variation in 
CSR to detect the effect of CSR on firm value in the presence of firm fixed effects. 
18 We also estimate the model in equation (1) using an overall measure of the strength of market-
supporting institutions, calculated by aggregating the stock market efficiency, credit market efficiency, 
the extent of business freedom, and legal system efficiency indices. The untabulated results are consistent 
with those in Table 3. That is, the coefficient on CSR is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, and the coefficient on the interaction between CSR and the overall strength of market-supporting 
institutions is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
19 We match with replacement. That is, a firm in the control group could be used as a match more than 
once.   
20 We also implement instrumental variables estimation using the industry-year average CSR score 
excluding the focal firm (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim, Li, & Li, 2014). The results, which are available in 
the online appendix, are qualitatively the same as those in Table 3. 
21 Our results are consistent with the economics-based profit-maximization view of CSR, coined as profit-
maximizing ethics (Windsor, 2001) or strategic CSR (Baron, 2001) in the literature. That is, socially 
responsible actions can have a positive impact on a firm’s cash flows, which is in line with the 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
TOBQ Tobin’s q measured as the ratio of the market value of assets to 
the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is 
total assets plus market capitalization minus book equity.  
Authors’ calculations 
based on Compustat data 
Equity Issue Indicator variable for firms issuing equity when the net amount 
issued divided by lagged assets exceeds 1%. The net amount 
issued is the change in book equity, plus the change in deferred 
taxes, minus the change in retained earnings (McLean et al., 
2012). 
As above 
Excess Growth Geometric average of externally financed growth rate over the 
next two years. The externally financed growth rate is 
measured as sales growth minus the maximum growth rate 
that can be financed if a firm relies only on its internal 
resources [ROA/(1-ROA)] (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 
2002). 
As above 
Debt Issue Indicator variable for firms issuing debt when the net amount 
issued divided by lagged assets exceeds 1%. The net amount 
issued is the change in total debt (McLean et al., 2012). 
As above 
Investment Ratio of capital expenditures to lagged property, plant, and 
equipment. 
As above 
Bankruptcy The probability of bankruptcy based on the Black–Scholes–
Merton option-pricing model which values equity as a European 
call option on the value of firm’s assets. The value of equity, , 
could be obtained as 
1 , where N(.) is the standard cumulative normal 
distribution, ⁄ 2⁄ √⁄ , 
√ ,  is the value of assets,	  is the dividend rate 
measured as dividends to ,  is the face value of debt 
measured as total liabilities,  is assumed equal to 1 year,  is 
the risk-free rate measured as the yield on the 1-year constant 
maturity U.S. Treasury Securities and  is the volatility of 
asset returns.  and  are estimated by solving the system of 
equations comprising the equity value equation above and the 
optimal hedge equation: 	⁄ , where  
is the volatility of equity returns computed over the previous 
year. Equity returns are obtained from CRSP (for U.S. firms) 
and Compustat Global (for non-U.S. firms). Then, firm’s asset 
returns could be obtained as , ,⁄ 1, . 





Payable Turnover Ratio of cost of goods sold to accounts payable. As above 
Sales Growth Future sales growth measured as the geometric average growth 
in sales over the next two years. 
As above 
CSR_P The overall CSR performance is equal to the average of 
environmental performance and social performance. 
Environmental performance measures a firm’s impact on living 
and non-living natural systems, including the air, land, and 
water, as well as complete ecosystems. Social performance 
measures a firm’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its 







SIZE Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets in 
millions of $US. 
Authors’ calculations 
based on Compustat data 
ROA Return on assets measured as the ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items to total assets. 
As above 
LEV Leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. As above 
R&D/S Ratio of research and development expenses to total sales. 
Missing research and development expenses are set to zero. 
As above 
SGR Sales growth measured as the change in sales from the previous 
year. 
As above 
LOG_GDP The natural logarithm of GDP per capita each year evaluation in 
year 2000 $US.  
Authors’ calculations 





Stock markets provide adequate financing to companies. 







Credit is easily available for business. Obtained from an 
executive survey based on an index of 0 to 10. 
As above 
Business Freedom An index of business regulations. Higher values of the index 
imply fewer regulations. The subcomponents of the index are: 
(1) Administrative requirements 
(2) Bureaucracy costs 
(3) Starting a business 
(4) Extra payments/bribes/favoritism 
(5) Licensing restrictions 
(6) Cost of tax compliance 
Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of 
the World 
Legal System & 
Property Rights 
An index of the quality of the legal system and the security of 
property rights. Higher values of the index imply better legal 
systems and more secure property rights. The subcomponents of 
the index are: 
(1) Judicial independence 
(2) Impartial courts 
(3) Protection of property rights 
(4) Military interference in rule of law and politics 
(5) Integrity of the legal system 
(6) Legal enforcement of contracts 
(7) Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property 
(8) Reliability of police 









Appendix B. Market-supporting institutions by country 
 









Australia 7.54 7.31 7.06 8.42 
Austria 5.87 6.64 6.91 8.54 
Belgium 6.12 6.23 6.74 7.26 
Brazil 4.98 4.14 3.91 4.84 
Canada 7.20 7.16 7.39 8.29 
Chile 6.59 6.77 6.77 7.20 
China 4.87 4.07 5.45 6.35 
Colombia 4.10 4.75 6.35 4.35 
Czech Republic 3.28 5.02 5.30 6.30 
Denmark 6.57 7.24 7.68 8.96 
Egypt . . 5.90 5.30 
Finland 6.48 7.82 7.76 8.98 
France 5.95 5.63 6.84 7.47 
Germany 6.39 5.38 6.91 8.51 
Greece 5.03 5.57 6.05 6.05 
Hong Kong 8.11 7.79 7.90 8.07 
Hungary 3.10 3.05 6.05 6.35 
India 6.64 5.94 5.13 5.80 
Indonesia 5.40 5.02 5.95 4.60 
Ireland 5.65 6.45 7.30 8.01 
Israel 6.20 5.92 6.68 6.29 
Italy 4.15 4.35 5.86 5.89 
Japan 5.90 5.83 6.75 7.65 
Kazakhstan 3.90 4.25 6.10 5.70 
Korea 5.36 4.81 6.64 6.78 
Kuwait . . 6.60 7.15 
Luxembourg 5.94 6.85 7.11 8.40 
Malaysia 6.88 6.30 6.75 6.65 
Mauritius . . 7.10 6.23 
Mexico 3.74 3.01 5.65 4.68 
Morocco . . 6.35 6.00 
Netherlands 6.79 6.76 6.76 8.41 
New Zealand 5.70 7.01 7.73 8.63 
Norway 6.84 7.18 7.17 8.84 
Panama . . 6.00 5.10 
Papua New Guinea . . 7.75 4.70 
Peru 4.23 5.13 5.95 5.10 
Philippines 4.96 5.28 5.75 4.50 
Poland 5.02 4.80 5.67 6.13 





Qatar 5.29 6.81 8.50 7.50 
Russian Federation 3.71 3.25 4.90 5.30 
Saudi Arabia . . 8.20 7.70 
Singapore 7.12 7.20 8.22 8.50 
South Africa 6.85 5.06 6.40 5.55 
Spain 5.64 5.48 6.23 6.69 
Sweden 7.10 7.06 7.51 8.44 
Switzerland 7.17 6.73 7.48 8.62 
Thailand 6.02 6.21 6.30 5.63 
Turkey 4.71 4.79 6.25 5.40 
United Arab 
Emirates . . 8.00 7.35 
United Kingdom 6.32 5.85 7.18 8.22 
United States 7.38 7.22 7.04 7.46 







Appendix C. Economic significance of market-supporting institutions by country 
 
We clarify how we obtain the economic significance of the impact of CSR on firm value in Table 




To evaluate the marginal impact of CSR_P on TOBQ, we calculate the derivative of TOBQ with 





We evaluate this derivative at the first quartile of Institution: α1+α3×Q1(Institution) and the third 
quartile of Institution: α1+α3×Q3(Institution) 
 
Then we obtain the effect of one-standard-deviation increase in CSR_P (0.29) on TOBQ evaluated 
at the first quartile of Institution: α1+α3×Q1(Institution)]×0.29 and the third quartile of Institution: 
α1+α3×Q3(Institution)]×0.29 
 
Finally, the difference: α1+α3×Q1(Institution)]-α1+α3×Q3(Institution)])×0.29 measures our 
economic significance of a one-standard-deviation increase in CSR_P (0.29) on TOBQ after an 
institutional change from the first to the third quartile.  
 
Our calculations are summarized in the table below. 
 












 α1 0.753 0.557 0.922 1.143 
 α3 -0.105 -0.078 -0.127 -0.143 
(3) Q1(Institution) 4.93 4.86 6.20 6.30 
(4) Q3(Institution) 6.92 7.35 7.40 8.40 














(6) Effect of one-standard-deviation 
increase in CSR_P (0.29) on TOBQ 
evaluated at Q1(Institution)=(5)×0.29 
0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 














(8) Effect of one-standard-deviation 
increase in CSR_P (0.29) on TOBQ 
evaluated at Q3(Institution)=(7)×0.29 
0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 














Table 1. Sample distribution 
 
Panel A. By country Panel A. By country (cont'd) 
Country N % Country N % 
Australia 407 3.49 Norway 116 0.99 
Austria 87 0.75 Panama 1 0.01 
Belgium 117 1.00 Papua New Guinea 3 0.03 
Brazil 59 0.51 Peru 2 0.02 
Canada 670 5.74 Philippines 4 0.03 
Chile 17 0.15 Poland 11 0.09 
China 36 0.31 Portugal 53 0.45 
Colombia 2 0.02 Qatar 1 0.01 
Czech Republic 5 0.04 Russian Federation 26 0.22 
Denmark 115 0.99 Saudi Arabia 3 0.03 
Egypt 2 0.02 Singapore 126 1.08 
Finland 154 1.32 South Africa 22 0.19 
France 461 3.95 Spain 232 1.99 
Germany 384 3.29 Sweden 249 2.13 
Greece 99 0.85 Switzerland 287 2.46 
Hong Kong 114 0.98 Thailand 13 0.11 
Hungary 3 0.03 Turkey 18 0.15 
India 46 0.39 United Arab Emirates 8 0.07 
Indonesia 13 0.11 United Kingdom 1,442 12.35 
Ireland 86 0.74 United States 3,658 31.34 
Israel 20 0.17 All countries 11,672 100 
Italy 163 1.40    
Japan 1,922 16.47 Panel B. By year 
Kazakhstan 2 0.02 Year N % 
Korea 73 0.63 2003 644 5.52 
Kuwait 2 0.02 2004 651 5.58 
Luxembourg 42 0.36 2005 1,231 10.55 
Malaysia 21 0.18 2006 1,541 13.20 
Mauritius 3 0.03 2007 1,555 13.32 
Mexico 36 0.31 2008 1,697 14.54 
Morocco 2 0.02 2009 2,009 17.21 
Netherlands 183 1.57 2010 2,344 20.08 









Table 1 (cont’d).  
 
Panel C. By industry 
Industry N % Industry N % 
Agriculture 30 0.26 Aircraft 125 1.07 
Food Products 335 2.87 Shipbuilding & Railroad Equipment 31 0.27 
Candy & Soda 48 0.41 Defense 9 0.08 
Beer & Liquor 150 1.29 Precious Metals 106 0.91 
Tobacco Products 61 0.52 Non-Metallic & Industrial Metal Mining 241 2.06 
Recreation 66 0.57 Coal 40 0.34 
Entertainment 115 0.99 Petroleum & Natural Gas 746 6.39 
Printing & Publishing 213 1.82 Utilities 692 5.93 
Consumer Goods 259 2.22 Communication 626 5.36 
Apparel 129 1.11 Personal Services 83 0.71 
Healthcare 103 0.88 Business Services 904 7.75 
Medical Equipment 205 1.76 Computers 260 2.23 
Pharmaceutical Products 419 3.59 Electronic Equipment 545 4.67 
Chemicals 510 4.37 Measuring & Control Equipment 129 1.11 
Rubber & Plastic Products 49 0.42 Business Supplies 175 1.50 
Textiles 21 0.18 Shipping Containers 50 0.43 
Construction Materials 296 2.54 Transportation 544 4.66 
Construction 404 3.46 Wholesale 331 2.84 
Steel Works 333 2.85 Retail 847 7.26 
Fabricated Products 10 0.09 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 189 1.62 
Machinery 463 3.97 Almost Nothing 266 2.28 
Electrical Equipment 162 1.39    
Automobiles & Trucks 352 3.02 All industries 11,672 100 
This table presents the sample distribution by country (Panel A), year (Panel B), and industry according to Fama 
and French’s (1997) classification (Panel C). The sample comprises 11,672 observations representing 2,445 








Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
   
Panel A. By country 
  TOBQ CSR_P 
Country N Mean SD Mean SD 
Australia 407 1.92 1.20 0.45 0.27 
Austria 87 1.49 0.74 0.59 0.25 
Belgium 117 1.60 0.79 0.50 0.28 
Brazil 59 1.83 1.44 0.68 0.24 
Canada 670 1.76 0.97 0.40 0.26 
Chile 17 1.68 0.54 0.45 0.29 
China 36 1.90 1.39 0.32 0.25 
Colombia 2 2.52 0.42 0.67 0.01 
Czech Republic 5 1.54 0.12 0.73 0.11 
Denmark 115 2.09 1.36 0.48 0.25 
Egypt 2 1.10 0.02 0.10 0.00 
Finland 154 1.59 0.64 0.69 0.23 
France 461 1.56 0.82 0.75 0.23 
Germany 384 1.49 0.80 0.66 0.26 
Greece 99 1.74 1.18 0.48 0.30 
Hong Kong 114 1.61 0.79 0.45 0.28 
Hungary 3 1.09 0.08 0.90 0.03 
India 46 2.84 1.82 0.67 0.24 
Indonesia 13 3.53 1.40 0.64 0.19 
Ireland 86 1.88 1.10 0.37 0.20 
Israel 20 2.28 0.81 0.26 0.19 
Italy 163 1.46 0.56 0.55 0.31 
Japan 1,922 1.31 0.57 0.55 0.30 
Kazakhstan 2 1.25 0.27 0.19 0.01 
Korea 73 1.48 0.92 0.69 0.28 
Kuwait 2 1.70 0.48 0.39 0.03 
Luxembourg 42 1.76 1.10 0.48 0.23 
Malaysia 21 1.93 0.91 0.44 0.23 
Mauritius 3 0.89 0.18 0.30 0.06 
Mexico 36 1.72 0.89 0.56 0.35 
Morocco 2 3.29 0.14 0.52 0.04 
Netherlands 183 1.58 0.61 0.71 0.23 
New Zealand 51 1.73 1.09 0.44 0.22 
Norway 116 1.85 0.96 0.60 0.28 
Panama 1 1.31 . 0.12 . 
Papua New Guinea 3 2.36 0.28 0.40 0.25 
Peru 2 3.88 0.51 0.26 0.00 
Philippines 4 1.87 0.61 0.44 0.27 





Portugal 53 1.51 0.55 0.70 0.22 
Qatar 1 2.70 . 0.19 . 
Russian Federation 26 2.02 1.36 0.40 0.24 
Saudi Arabia 3 1.34 0.28 0.29 0.25 
Singapore 126 1.71 0.75 0.35 0.21 
South Africa 22 2.41 1.30 0.63 0.24 
Spain 232 1.94 1.32 0.73 0.25 
Sweden 249 1.71 0.85 0.65 0.24 
Switzerland 287 2.14 1.13 0.60 0.29 
Thailand 13 1.97 0.62 0.52 0.28 
Turkey 18 2.06 1.44 0.47 0.27 
United Arab Emirates 8 1.52 0.29 0.19 0.08 
United Kingdom 1,442 1.78 0.92 0.61 0.24 
United States 3,658 1.99 1.09 0.44 0.28 
All countries 11,672 1.76 0.99 0.53 0.29 
Panel B. For the full sample 
Variable Mean Min Q1 Media
n 
Q3 Max SD 
TOBQt 1.76 0.73 1.13 1.43 2.00 6.29 0.99 
Equity Issuet 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Excess Growtht+1 0.01 -0.37 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.75 0.16 
Debt Issuet 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Investmentt 0.23 0.02 0.12 0.18 0.28 1.32 0.20 
Bankruptcyt 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.15 
Payable Turnovert 8.85 0.79 4.52 6.97 10.07 59.20 8.16 
Sales Growtht+1 0.07 -0.34 -0.02 0.05 0.13 0.80 0.17 
CSR_Pt-1 0.53 0.07 0.25 0.52 0.82 0.98 0.29 
SIZEt-1 8.63 1.69 7.72 8.53 9.52 13.59 1.36 
ROAt-1 0.14 -0.07 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.44 0.08 
LEVt-1 0.19 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.28 0.65 0.15 
R&D/St-1 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.31 0.06 
SGRt-1 0.09 -0.48 -0.02 0.06 0.16 1.38 0.25 
LOG_GDPt-1 10.28 6.51 10.16 10.48 10.55 10.94 0.49 
Stock market efficiencyt-1 5.97 2.26 4.93 6.10 6.92 9.07 1.32 
Credit market efficiencyt-1 6.04 1.98 4.86 6.18 7.35 8.82 1.56 
Business freedomt-1 6.74 3.50 6.20 6.70 7.40 9.00 0.95 
Legal system & property 
rightst-1 7.29 3.90 6.30 7.50 8.40 9.50 1.34 
This table presents descriptive statistics by country (Panel A) and for the full sample (Panel B). Appendix A 







Table 3. Corporate social responsibility and firm value 
 






Legal system & 
property rights 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR_Pt-1 0.753*** 0.557*** 0.922*** 1.143** 
 (4.904) (4.486) (3.733) (2.571) 
Institutiont-1 0.109*** 0.075*** 0.072* 0.149*** 
 (5.690) (5.678) (1.945) (3.160) 
CSR_Pt-1×Institutiont-1 -0.105*** -0.078*** -0.127*** -0.143** 
 (-4.844) (-4.603) (-3.597) (-2.517) 
SIZEt-1 -0.378*** -0.375*** -0.376*** -0.375*** 
 (-11.869) (-11.884) (-11.712) (-11.741) 
ROAt-1 0.813*** 0.807*** 0.799*** 0.796*** 
 (4.176) (4.151) (4.134) (4.129) 
LEVt-1 -0.193* -0.181 -0.187 -0.196* 
 (-1.654) (-1.549) (-1.588) (-1.664) 
R&D/St-1 -0.021 0.006 0.084 0.031 
 (-0.027) (0.008) (0.109) (0.041) 
SGRt-1 0.050 0.052 0.058 0.054 
 (1.359) (1.410) (1.551) (1.461) 
LOG_GDPt-1 0.731 0.731 1.111** 1.155** 
 (1.531) (1.531) (2.297) (2.399) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,648 11,648 11,672 11,672 
R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.270 0.271 
This table reports results from regressing Tobin’s q (TOBQ) on CSR performance (CSR_P) and interactions 
between CSR performance and the four proxies for country-level institutions. All models include firm and year 
fixed effects. Appendix A provides definitions and data sources for all variables. t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 








Table 4. Corporate social responsibility and firm value: Channels 
 




Business freedom Legal system & 
property rights 
Dependent variable:  Equity Issuet Excess 
Growtht+1 
Debt Issuet Excess 
Growtht+1 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CSR_Pt-1 1.288** 0.068* 1.720*** 0.054* 0.225*** -0.186** -8.987** 0.257* 
 (2.055) (1.693) (3.579) (1.720) (2.855) (-2.473) (-2.254) (1.900) 
Institutiont-1 0.053 0.020*** 0.193*** 0.009*** 0.002 -0.073*** -0.300 0.026* 
 (0.712) (4.156) (3.745) (3.117) (0.146) (-6.265) (-0.678) (1.769) 
CSR_Pt-1×Institutiont-1 -0.278*** -0.013** -0.204*** -0.012*** -0.029** 0.027*** 1.175** -0.037** 
 (-3.065) (-2.442) (-3.073) (-2.814) (-2.561) (2.749) (2.317) (-2.152) 
SIZEt-1 -1.123*** -0.144*** -0.843*** -0.144*** -0.088*** 0.003 0.540** -0.173*** 
 (-10.978) (-9.494) (-8.572) (-9.419) (-7.128) (0.621) (2.256) (-10.965) 
ROAt-1 0.199 -0.732*** 4.015*** -0.735*** 0.267*** -0.006 1.362 -0.570*** 
 (0.325) (-10.234) (6.350) (-10.257) (4.824) (-0.254) (0.959) (-8.289) 
LEVt-1 1.636*** 0.011 -6.599*** 0.012 -0.156*** -0.028 0.554 0.041 
 (4.464) (0.356) (-16.112) (0.389) (-5.152) (-1.502) (0.594) (1.364) 
R&D/St-1 0.269 0.295** 0.229 0.306** -0.366** -0.111** -1.939 0.354*** 
 (0.181) (2.449) (0.143) (2.550) (-2.359) (-2.425) (-0.283) (2.792) 
SGRt-1 -0.088 -0.039*** -0.477*** -0.039*** 0.037*** 0.011** 0.373 -0.024** 
 (-0.724) (-3.521) (-3.777) (-3.496) (3.255) (2.020) (1.012) (-2.152) 
LOG_GDPt-1 5.636*** 0.207 4.084** 0.265* 0.414*** -0.082 -3.580 0.264* 
 (3.542) (1.356) (2.462) (1.725) (3.320) (-1.645) (-0.932) (1.674) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,994 9,505 9,639 9,505 11,621 8,835 11,265 9,539 
R-squared . 0.276 . 0.275 0.135 0.111 0.021 0.336 
This table reports results from regressing firm-level outcomes on CSR performance (CSR_P) and interactions between CSR 
performance and the four proxies for country-level institutions. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Columns (1) 
and (3) are estimated using logit regressions and do not have an R-squared. Appendix A provides definitions and data sources 
for all variables. t-statistics based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
